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Finally Poised
for Major
Change?
When, several decades ago, interested observers began commenting on the
absence of women and minorities from corporate boardrooms and executive
suites, there was not much data on the role of women in the national
economy, little benchmarking, and few efforts to make the business case for
breaking down the barriers that had been excluding women from positions
of corporate power. Since that time, academic researchers and activists
from many venues have produced a wealth of data, arguments for diversify-
ing corporate leadership, and strategies and resources designed to create
opportunities for women and minorities to advance to those positions. And
yet, in 2006, the face of corporate leadership in the United States remains
essentially unchanged: white and male. After describing the current land-
scape, this article analyzes the strength of the foundation for change that
has been laid in recent years and points to some current trends that may
portend a significant acceleration of the glacial pace at which women have
been taking seats on boards and in executive offices. Whether the “tipping
point” will occur within the next several years is unclear. What is certain,
however, is that growing dissatisfaction with the performance of corporate
leaders is creating more pressure for change and, consequently, a greater
likelihood of expanded opportunities for those groups of outsiders whose
talents have been ignored for too long. Indications that women are starting
to take advantage of those opportunities — for themselves and for other
women — are a hopeful sign that the face of corporate leadership may
change dramatically in the years ahead.
t was only in the late 1970s that attention began to be paid to the dearth
of women who serve in leadership positions in American companies. In
1977, when the nonprofit organization Catalyst instituted a corporate board
service designed to introduce corporations to accomplished business and
professional women, there were only 147 women directors on the boards of
I
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the nation’s 1,300 largest public companies.1 Similarly, there were few
women who held the senior executive titles most likely to attract the atten-
tion of those CEOs and board chairmen who were receptive to considering
women for board positions.2 Since that time, a number of other national and
regional organizations have undertaken similar efforts to advance talented
women to corporate leadership by making the business case for board
diversification, developing recruitment, board training and search pro-
grams, benchmarking and tracking progress, and spotlighting corporate
leaders who have embraced best practices and helped to level the playing
field for women leaders.
And yet, despite all of these efforts, progress over the past thirty years
has been excruciatingly slow. Women today comprise but a small percent-
age of corporate directors and senior executives, a phenomenon that is
inconsistent not only with past predictions but also with the steadily grow-
ing clout of women in the economy, the increasing visibility of a large pool
of untapped talent and the strength of the business case for diversifying
corporate leadership in order to compete more effectively in the new global
economy. Nevertheless, there are grounds to be cautiously optimistic about
the future. After describing the current situation, which The Boston Club
has described as “Stuck in Neutral,”3 this article explores the strength of the
foundation for change and some of the forces that can be harnessed to
hasten the transformation of corporate leadership from “monochromatic”
to vibrant.
THE CURRENT FACE OF CORPORATE LEADERSHIP
In a 1980 Harvard Business Review article, Felice Schwartz, the founder of
Catalyst, opined: “The wall surrounding the corporate community, if it can
be claimed to exist at all, is today a highly permeable one.”4 After noting
the increasing degree of regulation by government, pressure for greater
accountability and recognition by corporate leaders that they must be
concerned “with the environment in which [they function] and with the
human as well as the consumer needs of the people,” Schwartz quotes the
male chairman of a major company who states of women: “They are a
group whose time has come.”5
Women Corporate Directors
Twenty-five years later, however, women hold only a small percentage of
the board seats in U.S. corporations. Indeed, women comprise only 16
percent of the directors of the 200 largest publicly held companies in
America, the companies that historically have been the most active in
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diversifying their boards of directors.6 Current data on the board composi-
tion of publicly held companies based in particular parts of the country,
including many that are much smaller than those in the Fortune 500, paint
an even more dismal picture.7
Table 1
Women Directors of U.S. Corporations in 2005
Pool  of Companies    Percent of Board Seats
             Filled by Women
National, Top 200 of S&P 500 16.0
National, Fortune 500 14.7
National, Top 100 Banks 12.4
Minnesota, Top 30 public companies 16.0
Chicago, Top 50 public companies 14.4
Wisconsin, Top 50 public companies 10.8
California, Top 200 public companies 10.2
Michigan, Top 100 public companies 10.0
Massachusetts, Top 100 public companies 9.9
Philadelphia, Top 99 public companies 9.3
New Hampshire, All 25 public companies 8.8
Florida, Top 147 public companies 7.9
Georgia, All 187 public companies 7.1
Sources: Spencer Stuart, 2006 Board Diversity Report; Catalyst, 2005 Catalyst Census of
Women Board Directors of the Fortune 500; Corporate Women Directors International,
Women Board Directors of the Largest Global and U.S. Banks; Spencer Stuart, Minnesota
Board Index 2005; ION (InterOrganization Network), February 2006 Status Report on Women
Directors and Executive Officers of Public Companies in Seven Regions of the United States;
UC Davis, Study of California Women Business Leaders, February 2006; The New Hampshire
Women’s Policy Institute, The Economic Status of Working Women in New Hampshire, May
2005.
In addition to being very low in an absolute sense, these numbers reflect
relatively little improvement over the past decade. Since 1995, when Cata-
lyst released its first census of women board directors, the percentage of
board seats held by women in the 500 largest public companies in the
United States has gone from 9.6 to 14.7 percent, or an average annual
increase of 0.5 percent. At that rate, Catalyst projects that parity will not
be reached for another seventy years!8 A similarly glacial rate of growth is
documented by the members of the InterOrganization Network (ION), the
national network of women’s advocacy organizations that, among other
things, tracks the number and percentage of women directors and executive
officers in public companies based in their respective regions.9
Further, a significant number of American companies continue to have no
women directors on their boards. Catalyst reports that in 2005, 53 of the
Fortune 500 (10.6 percent) had all male boards; in 1995, the comparable
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figure was 96 (19.2 percent). Analogous figures reported by ION members
are much higher, reflecting the tendency of smaller companies to have fewer
women on their boards.10
Finally, the situation is substantially bleaker for women of color who face
barriers of race and ethnicity as well as gender. In 2005, women of color
held 3.1 percent of the board seats in Fortune 500 companies, down from
3.7 percent in 2003.11 The five members of ION that collected comparable
information reported that the percentage of seats held by women of color on
the boards of the companies included in their respective studies ranged from
0.1 percent to 1.9 percent in 2005.12
The foregoing statistics look somewhat better when viewed in compari-
son to those collected for companies based in other countries, with the
exception of Scandinavia. Nevertheless, legislation enacted in some coun-
tries and advocacy efforts by organizations such as the European Profes-
sional Women’s Network are likely to result in significant progress over the
next several years. Unless there is similar improvement in the United States,
American companies are likely to fall well below the average in future
international comparisons.
Table 2
Women Corporate Directors Outside the U.S. in 2005
Country       Percent of Board Seats    Country      Percentage of Board
     Filled by Women   Seats Filled by Women
Norway 28.8
Sweden 22.8
Finland 20.0
Denmark 17.9
Australia 15.0
Canada 12.4
United Kingdom 11.4
Austria   9.5
Republic of Ireland   8.1
Sources: for Australia, Korn/Ferry International, in association with Egan Associates, 2005 Board of
Directors Study in Australia and New Zealand (figure based on the top 100 companies); for
Canada, Spencer Stuart, 2005 Canadian Board Index (figure based on the top 100 companies); for
all others, European Professional Women’s Network and Egon Zehnder International, Second Bi-
annual EuropeanPWN BoardWomen Monitor 2006, June 2006 (www.europeanpwn.net). Note:
some of the latter figures are overstated as they are based on a relatively small pool comprised
only of the largest public companies in Western Europe (the FTSEurofirst 300 Index, supplemented
for those countries with fewer than 10 companies on that Index). The comparable percentages
for all 491 listed companies in Norway is 18 percent, for the UK’s FTSE 100 is 10.5 percent, and for
the 100 leading companies in the Netherlands is 3.6 percent (Id.; Val Singh and Susan Vinnicombe,
The Female FTSE Index 2005, Cranfield University School of Management (www.cranfield.ac.uk/
som); Spencer Stuart, The Netherlands Board Index 2005).
France 7.6
Germany  7.2
The Netherlands  6.5
Switzerland  5.9
Belgium  5.8
Greece  4.4
Spain  4.1
Italy  1.9
Portugal  0.0
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Women Executive Officers
The executive suite is the second seat of corporate power. Accordingly, any
assessment of the status of women in corporate leadership must also look at
women who have risen to the rank of executive officer or are among the top
five most highly compensated executives in American corporations. In
addition to serving in positions of critical importance to the success of their
companies, these women constitute a major segment of the pipeline of
candidates for directorships in other companies. Unfortunately, the statistics
are as gloomy for women executives as they are for women directors.
Table 3
Women Corporate Executives  of U.S. Corporations in 2005
Pool of                          Percentage of Executives
Companies          Who are Women
National, Fortune 500 16.4
Chicago, Top 50 public companies 15.4
New Hampshire, All 25 public companies 13.0
Wisconsin, Top 50 public companies 11.0
Philadelphia, Top 99 public companies  10.2
Massachusetts, Top 100 public companies 10.1
California, Top 200 public companies  8.2
Georgia, All 187 public companies 8.2
Michigan, Top 100 public companies  7.7
Florida, Top 147 public companies  7.6
Sources: 2005 Catalyst Census of Women Corporate Officers and Top Earners
of the Fortune 500; ION (InterOrganization Network), February 2006 Status
Report on Women Directors and Executive Officers of Public Companies in
Seven Regions of the United States; UC Davis. Study of California Women
Business Leaders, February 2006;  New Hampshire Women’s Policy Institute,
The Economic Status of Working Women in New Hampshire, May 2005.
As is the case with women directors, changes in the percentages of
women who hold senior executive positions have been small. In some cases,
moreover, progress has stalled and in others, the current situation reflects a
step or two backwards. For example, among the Fortune 500 companies,
the percentage of women corporate officers rose from 8.7 percent in 1995 to
15.7 percent in 2002; between 2002 and 2005, however, that percentage
grew only to 16.4 percent, a miniscule improvement.13 There are still 67
companies or 13.4 percent of the pool that have no women corporate
officers, a bare improvement over 2002 when the figure was 71 companies
(14.2 percent ).14
On the regional level, the figures shown in Table 3 reflect a mix of modest
advances and retreats. Only three members of ION reported an increase in
the percent of women executive officers in the companies in their respective
areas in 2005; and only three reported a decrease in the number of compa-
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nies with no women executive officers.15 In Massachusetts, the percentage
of women executive officers among the 100 largest public companies in-
creased from 9.2 percent in 2004 to 10.1 percent in 2005, and the number of
companies without a woman executive officer decreased from sixty-six in
2003 to fifty in 2004 to forty-eight in 2005, still a very large number.16 In
Georgia, however, where the Board of Directors Network has been tracking
women executives since 1998, the percentage of companies that have
women executive officers is today lower than it was in 2002.17
These statistics and patterns demonstrate that without concerted action
to accelerate the process of change, the face of corporate leadership in the
United States is likely to remain white and male for several more genera-
tions.
THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE
Following the collapse of Enron and the corporate scandals that resulted in
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and new regulations from
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and major stock exchanges,
many observers expected that increased attention to good governance and
“best practices” would create opportunities to accelerate change in the
composition of American corporate leadership. Armed with data showing
the significant role that women have been playing in the national economy,
women’s advocacy organizations honed their messages with an eye to
making the business case for the need to expand the networks that board
chairmen and CEOs had traditionally relied on when looking for new
directors. These groups hoped to take advantage of these opportunities and
open the doors for more women to move into leadership by issuing well-
researched reports, carefully tracking board membership and leadership,
reaching out to those individuals and groups having the greatest influence
on the board selection process, and publicizing both the “stars” and the
“laggards.” They expected, perhaps naively, that those in positions to bring
about change would do so and that the pace at which women would join
corporate boards and enter executive suites would significantly accelerate.
As noted above, however, that has not yet happened. The pattern of
appointments and elections during the past several years is hardly distin-
guishable from that of the preceding several years; such progress as has
been made can only be measured in tenths of a percentage point. Neverthe-
less, the events and hard work of the past decade have provided a solid
foundation for change in the face of corporate leadership. An appreciation
of the components of that foundation is necessary in order to develop the
allies and strategies that will result in major transformation and the ad-
vancement of significantly more women to positions of corporate power.
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The Impact of Legislative and Regulatory Change
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and subsequent rules adopted by the New
York, American, and NASDAQ stock exchanges together set the stage for
substantial change in the composition of the boards of directors of publicly
listed companies. The new requirements and restrictions as to board mem-
bership have created a need for new directors, thereby offering opportuni-
ties to qualified individuals whose talents have been historically ignored.
Among the more significant provisions in this regard are the following:18
•  The boards of all listed companies must have a majority of
independent directors, “independence” is more tightly defined,
and companies must identify which directors are independent and
the basis for the characterization.
•  The audit committees of all listed companies must consist
entirely of independent directors, and companies must identify
those audit committee members who qualify as “financial ex-
perts” as defined by the SEC.
•  The nomination and compensation decisions of all listed compa-
nies must be made by committees comprised entirely of indepen-
dent directors, or, in certain instances for companies listed on the
American or NASDAQ exchanges, of a majority of independent
directors.
•  The nominating committees of all listed companies must have
charters describing the criteria for the selection of directors, the
recruitment and nomination process, and an annual performance
evaluation of those committees.
As a result of these requirements, as well as the fallout from recent corpo-
rate scandals, including litigation exposing corporate directors to personal
liability, service on corporate boards has become significantly more time
consuming, and potential directors are becoming more selective about the
companies with which they will associate. The boards of many companies
have restricted their CEOs and other executive officers from serving on the
boards of more than one other company; several have precluded such board
service altogether. In addition, the proxy statements and corporate gover-
nance guidelines of many companies now reflect policies setting term limits,
imposing mandatory retirement ages and restricting the number of other
boards on which directors may sit. More recently, concern over what some
believe to be excessive CEO compensation has led to a closer look at the
composition of compensation committees and to the kinds of interlocking
and multiple directorships that can adversely affect the independence of
those charged with protecting the interests of the companies’ shareholders
and can encourage the spread of harmful practices.19
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The interplay of all of the foregoing factors has resulted in the need for a
significantly greater pool of candidates for board positions: individuals who
have the time as well as the experience, the skills, and the personal qualities
to be exemplary directors; individuals who qualify as “financial experts;”
and individuals with backgrounds that will enable them to play productive
roles on compensation committees. At the same time, the transfer of respon-
sibility for board nominations from the CEO to the nominating committee,
the increasing attention being paid to nominating committee policies and
procedures, and the disclosure in proxy statements of the actual sources of
board nominees are causing boards to move away from traditional ways of
identifying new directors and to undertake concerted efforts to reach
beyond the informal networks on which those boards previously relied for
this purpose. In some cases, the retirement of longtime directors from those
corporate boards that have adopted mandatory retirement ages and term
limits, in addition to creating board vacancies, removes additional obstacles
to change.
The end result is the creation of a substantial number of new board
opportunities for individuals whose talents and accomplishments were not
known to, or were ignored by, corporate leaders in the past. Senior women
in business and the professions comprise a large segment of that hitherto
untapped resource. The extent to which women will fill these seats, and the
pace at which that happens, however, will be largely a function of nominat-
ing committee understanding and acceptance of the need to diversify the
board, pressure by shareholders and institutional investors, and recognition
of the strength of the available talent pool.
Acceptance of the Business Case for Diversity at the Top
There is a growing volume of literature on the subject of the value that
women and minorities bring to corporate leadership, whether in the board-
room or in the executive suite. This literature includes research that corre-
lates board diversity with good corporate governance practices and re-
search that correlates board and management diversity with superior
economic performance.20 Other commentators eschew statistical studies and
focus their attention on factors such as the changing composition of the
marketplace, the globalization of the economy, and the importance of
diversity to corporate reputation and employee morale, arguing that the
diversification of corporate leadership is not only a matter of good business
sense but is imperative to survival in today’s business environment. And still
others emphasize the organizational dynamics of corporate leadership,
linking the diversity of backgrounds and perspectives brought by individual
directors and executives to the quality of their joint decision-making.
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However it may be formulated, the business case for bringing more
women into corporate leadership positions includes at least several of the
following components.
Women dominate the marketplace. The fact that women constitute the
overwhelming majority of American consumers is not lost on those compa-
nies wise enough to understand the dynamics of a highly competitive and
constantly changing global marketplace. While most people assume that
women are the primary purchasers of food, clothing and household goods,
they may not be aware of the following:
•  Women are responsible for 83 percent of all consumer pur-
chases; in 2001 alone, they spent $3.7 trillion on consumer goods
and services and were responsible for another $1.5 trillion as
purchasing agents.21
•  Women account for 91 percent of all new home purchases and
buy 94 percent of all home furnishings.22
•  In 2003, women accounted for $55 billion of the $96 billion
spent on consumer electronics purchases; they buy 66 percent of
all home computers and buy 60 percent of all automobiles.23
•  Women are responsible for more than 67 percent of all
healthcare spending, and 92 percent of women have sole or joint
responsibility for purchases of long-term care insurance.24
•  Women purchase $44.5 billion of office supplies.25
•  Women account for about 50 percent of all business travel and
the majority of consumer travel.26
•  Women own 89 percent of all bank accounts and carry 76
million credit cards, 8 million more than men; 62 percent of all
women manage their family’s checking account, compared to 38
percent of men; and 58 percent pay the family’s bills, compared to
35 percent of men.27
In addition, women-owned and women-controlled businesses constitute a
growing segment of the economy. In 2004, there were approximately 10.6
million privately-held companies of which women owned 50 percent or
more; those companies generated $2.46 trillion in sales and employed 19.1
million people.28
By including on their boards of directors women and men who bring
diverse perspectives based on different backgrounds and experience, compa-
nies substantially increase the likelihood that in formulating their growth
strategies they will neither ignore nor misunderstand key segments of their
potential markets.29 In addition, they send powerful affirming messages to
the women who make the buying decisions that drive business sales and
profits.
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Women control substantial assets and investments. Women today also
constitute a growing percentage of corporate shareholders, and in making
and monitoring their investments, they are increasingly concerned with
issues of good corporate governance and social responsibility, including the
composition of corporate leadership. The extent of women’s financial
holdings should not be underestimated.
•  Women currently control $14 trillion.30
•  Women comprise 41 percent of the 3.3 million people reporting
incomes of $500,000 or more.31
•  80 percent of women are responsible for their families’ fi-
nances.32
•  72 percent of women business owners and 58 percent of all
workingwomen own stocks and bonds.33
•  46 percent of women manage their families’ savings and invest-
ment accounts, compared to 42 percent of men.34
•  91 percent of women have sole or joint responsibility for pur-
chasing annuities.35
In order to attract and retain investors, companies must demonstrate their
commitment to building a workforce that at all levels, including their board-
rooms and executive suites, consists of the best and the brightest, regardless
of gender, race, or ethnicity. In this era of increasing shareholder activism,
this factor is more important than ever. Indeed, in one recent period, share-
holder resolutions that address board diversity achieved the highest average
votes of any social issue proposals.36
Women comprise a growing segment of the labor force. The recruitment
and retention of a talented labor force is of prime importance to all partici-
pants in the global economy, and women comprise a large segment of the
talent pool for skilled employees, managers, and executives.
•  In 2005, 66.8 million women aged 16 and older were employed
on a full-time basis, comprising 46.4 percent of all full-time wage
and salaried workers in the U.S.37 Inclusion of part-time workers
would greatly increase these figures.
•  In 2005, women were 61.9 percent of all accountants and
auditors; they are more than 50 percent of all accounting gradu-
ates and over 30 percent of the members of the American Institute
of CPAs.38 These women are part of a growing pool of talent for
financially literate executives and board members.
•  In the 2002-2003 academic year, women earned 57.5 percent of
all bachelor’s degrees, 58.8 percent of all master’s degrees and
47.1 percent of all doctorate degrees in the United States,39 indi-
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cating that the pipeline for women to fill managerial and execu-
tive positions is continuing to strengthen.
There is evidence that companies with more women directors have more
women in executive positions and also tend to offer more “women-friendly”
benefit packages and better parental leave policies.40 Diversity at the
leadership level, moreover, has a great influence on the quality of the
workforce as a whole as it delivers an important message about a
company’s culture, its commitment to attracting and retaining the most
talented and dedicated employees, and the opportunities for other women to
advance through the ranks to managerial, executive and senior leadership
positions. Research shows that “a diverse staff enhances financial perfor-
mance, reduces turnover, improves productivity, increases job satisfaction
and employee morale, decreases vulnerability to legal challenges, and
enhances the corporate reputation.”41 Nor should the importance of role
models and mentors be discounted. Ambitious women who find themselves
in companies with all male boards of directors and few, if any, women
executive officers are likely to look elsewhere to advance their careers,
resulting in a loss of investment as well as a loss of talent.
Women in leadership goes hand in hand with superior financial perfor-
mance. Numerous studies published during the past decade demonstrate a
correlation between the presence of women in positions of corporate leader-
ship — on boards of directors or in senior executive positions, or both —
and superior financial performance. For example,
•  A 1998 study of S&P 500 companies found that companies with
the most women and minority directors had shareholder returns
that were 21 percent higher than those of companies with all
white male boards.42
•  In 2001, a Glass Ceiling Research Center study that tracked the
number of women in senior executive positions at 215 Fortune 500
companies from 1980 to 1998 and compared the financial perfor-
mance of those companies to industry means reported a strong
correlation between the number of female senior executives and
company profitability as measured in several different ways. In
particular, the twenty-five companies with the highest percentage
of women executives were found to be between 18 percent and 69
percent more profitable than the median for other Fortune 500
companies in their industries.43
•  In 2002, the Conference Board of Canada found that firms with
two or more women directors in 1995 were much more likely than
firms with all-male boards to be in leadership positions in their
industries in 2000, when ranked by both revenues and profits.44
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•  In 2003, three Oklahoma State University professors studying
Fortune 1000 firms found a significant positive relationship be-
tween the percentage of women or minority directors and firm
value.45
•  A 2003 study of financial performance data for 127 large U.S.
corporations in 1993 and 1998 reported a positive correlation
between the percentage of women and minority directors and
returns on assets and investment.46
•  In January 2004, Catalyst reported a link between greater
gender diversity among the corporate officers of 353 companies in
the Fortune 500 and better financial performance by those compa-
nies over the period 1996–2000, measured by both return on
equity and total return to shareholders; the correlation held true
for each of the five industries that Catalyst analyzed.47
•  A 2005 study by Citizens Advisers analyzed the 298 companies
in the Citizens Index, each of which had at least one woman or
minority on its board of directors or in the upper two levels of its
management, and found that the total and average annual return
on the stock of those companies with the highest gender diversity
was several percentage points higher than that of the companies
with the lowest gender diversity and also had less volatility or risk
than those companies with fewer women.48
While these studies do not purport to demonstrate a causal relationship
between the presence of women in positions of corporate leadership and
stronger financial performance, at the very least they show that the two go
hand in hand. As such, they reinforce the conclusions of those who advance
the case for diversity as a common sense response to the increased economic
clout of women and their growing importance as corporate stakeholders of
every kind.
Women in leadership enhances the quality of corporate governance. As J.
Phillips L. Johnston succinctly put it in a recent issue of Directors & Boards:
“If the function of the board is to provide guidance in corporate mission,
vision, and values, the vision most white male board members are likely to
provide is monochromatic. Monochromatic vision in a world of increasingly
vibrant colors is a recipe for stagnation, if not abject failure.”49 The quality
of both discussion and decision-making at the highest levels of corporate
leadership is significantly improved by bringing to bear the widest possible
range of thinking, perspectives, experience and abilities.
As the Conference Board of Canada stated in its May 2002 report,
“Diversity is about enriching the leadership palette with different perspec-
tives;” it provides a competitive advantage in the current economy and also
49
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ensures that the full range of strategic risks facing the company are identi-
fied. The Conference Board sees “outer diversity,” being a woman, for
example, as a proxy for what it calls “inner diversity” or “the range of
inward, invisible qualities of individuals.” Rather than relying upon popular
stereotypes about women’s leadership styles, the authors simply suggest that
women and other visible minorities are likely to bring different sets of skills,
experiences, and perspectives that produce constructive debate in the
boardroom, the kind of creative tension and constructive dissent that will
ultimately result in clear strategic direction and add value to risk manage-
ment and oversight.50 A Blue Ribbon Commission of the National Associa-
tion of Corporate Directors had previously characterized a board comprised
of such diverse individuals as a “strategic asset” board.51
To test that theory, the Conference Board of Canada collected a variety
of data from Canadian corporations in a wide range of industries and
conducted surveys of those companies every two years from 1973 through
2001. Based on their research, the authors found that the presence of
women on boards has a practical as well as a symbolic effect: it changes the
functioning and deliberative style of the board in clear and consistent ways
that are linked to good governance, which in turn improves organizational
performance over the long term.52 Among other things, the Conference
Board found that:
•  74 percent of boards with three or more women, but only 45
percent of all-male boards, identified criteria for measuring
strategy;
•  94 percent of boards with three or more women, but only 66
percent of all-male boards, monitored the implementation of
corporate strategy;
•  91 percent of boards with three or more women, but only 74
percent of all-male boards, verified the integrity of audit informa-
tion;
•  80 percent of boards with three or more women, but only 58
percent of all-male boards, set objectives to measure management
performance;
•  94 percent of boards with three or more women, but only 68
percent of all-male boards, ensured conflict of interest guidelines;
•  86 percent of boards with three or more women, but only 66
percent of all-male boards, ensured that the corporation had a
code of conduct; and
•  86 percent of boards with three or more women, but only 71
percent of all-male boards ensured effective communication
between the corporation and its stakeholders.53
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In addition, the authors note that boards with two or more women direc-
tors, and even boards with only one women director, regularly reviewed
non-financial performance measures such as customer satisfaction and
employee satisfactions significantly more than did all-male boards. Further,
boards with women directors were “more likely to consider measures of
innovation and of social and community responsibility.” Not surprisingly,
the Conference Board concluded that the “noticeable effect” that women
have on the functioning of the board directly contributes to organizational
performance and, ultimately, corporate results.54
Researchers at the UK’s Cranfield School of Management have focused
on other aspects of corporate governance, following guidance provided by
the Higgs Review and Tyson Report of 2003.55 Limiting their study to a
series of indicators relating to the board selection process, the development
of directors once appointed, and the contribution of new directors, these
researchers found “clear evidence that better managed companies [among
the FTSE 100 in 2004] are those that have women on their boards.”56 The
following year, the Cranfield researchers found that companies with women
directors “had higher scores for process transparency, were more likely to
have board development processes in place, and to report compliance on
independent measures” than did those with all-male boards.57
Pointedly absent from the list of components of the business case for
leadership diversity are any assertions (or even implications) that women
should be appointed to leadership positions because it is “the right thing to
do,” because it is “only fair,” because women “have earned” the right to
those positions, or just because they are women. All of the business case
proponents understand that there is a large pool of accomplished and
qualified women interested in taking leadership roles and, while some may
urge corporate leaders to take steps to avoid the kinds of “competency
testing” and “sexual static” that have too often been permitted to confuse
the processes of board and executive suite selection,58 none of them seeks
preferential treatment for women simply because of their gender. They
know that the strongest arguments for diversity use that term in the broad-
est sense to include the full range of experience, skill sets, and perspectives
that insure the fresh thinking and strategic mindsets that companies need in
order to be successful. Moreover, proponents of diverse leadership know
that an appreciation of the business case for diversity means that companies
will not be satisfied by being able to point to just one woman or a minority
director or executive officer. A commitment to diversity ultimately will lead
to boardrooms and executive suites composed of groups of men and women
selected for their individual qualities without regard to gender, race, or
ethnicity.59
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The Strength of the Talent Pool
Too often in the past, CEOs, nominating committees, and even executive
recruiters have responded to inquiries about why there are so few women
directors and executive officers by claiming that there are few “qualified”
women, “we” don’t know how to find them, women shy away from the
career choices that provide the relevant experience and skills, or women
tend to “drop out” or otherwise indicate a lack of ambition. Such responses
largely have been discredited. One has only to look at the identities of the
women listed as directors of the public companies tracked in the 2005
reports of Catalyst and the members of ION to see the breadth and depth of
this talent pool.60 Some ION members also identify the women whom the
companies in their respective regions list as executive officers in their public
filings with the SEC.61 And while Catalyst does not identify by name the
1,783 women who held corporate officer positions at Fortune 500 compa-
nies in 2005, that information can be readily obtained from information
provided in the report’s appendix, which lists the companies and titles of all
of those women.62
As executive and board search firm Spencer Stuart has acknowledged,
the identification and recruitment of qualified women and minority directors
requires an outreach beyond the networks traditionally relied upon as
sources for board candidates and a willingness to consider individuals who
are not active or retired CEOs and do not serve on multiple boards.63 This is
a position that women’s advocacy groups have been advancing for many
years. An indication that this message has been heard is found in Spencer
Stuart’s report that it has placed 277 women and 150 minority candidates
on boards of directors since 2000 and that searches for women or minority
directors comprised one-third of all of its board searches in 2005.64
That being said, however, women still face obstacles as they seek to
advance to positions of corporate power. From gender stereotyping to
competency testing, they are still too often required to be more qualified
than any male candidates under consideration for promotion or for board
appointments. The fact that so many women have overcome those obstacles
reflects the resilience as well as the strength of the talent pool.
The Voices for Change
The academic researchers and women’s advocacy groups whose works are
cited in the foregoing pages have not been the only voices calling for change
in the composition of corporate leadership. For many years, the socially
responsible investment (SRI) community has taken a leadership role in
advancing proposals for board diversity and for nondiscriminatory employ-
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ment practices at every level of the corporation. Many socially responsible
fund managers use diversity not only as an initial investment “screen” but
also as a factor in their decisions to acquire more of or to divest their
holdings in a particular company.65 Once invested, these SRIs exercise the
power of their proxies to promote greater diversity. In addition to support-
ing shareholder proposals that call for more women on boards of directors,
many of them refuse to support slates of candidates when either the slates
themselves or the boards as a whole are comprised of only white males. For
example,
•  Calvert opposes slates of directors that result in a board that
does not include both women and people of color and may oppose
slates that include women and people of color if Calvert concludes
that their presence on the board “constitutes mere token represen-
tation.”66
•  Citizens Funds normally withholds votes from a slate of nomi-
nees if the slate does not include any women or minorities.67
•  Domini Social Investments withholds support for the nominees
of any board that does not include women or people of color.68
•  Trillium Asset Management will vote in favor of a board only
“if at least 20 percent of its members are women and/or minori-
ties.”69
•  Walden Asset Management withholds votes from director
nominees “if the board does not include at least one woman
director and at least one minority director.”70
  Some large foundations and pension fund managers are among the other
institutional investors that leverage multi-billion dollar investments to
support board and executive level diversity. For example, The Boston
Foundation not only will vote for shareholder proposals that seek greater
board diversity, but will withhold votes from a director who serves on a
nominating committee “that has failed to establish gender and/or racial
diversity on the board.”71 In 2004, Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors and
As You Sow Foundation released a major report urging all foundations to
adopt “active, engaged, proxy voting” in order to advance their missions
while assuring themselves a better return on their investments.72 Organiza-
tions such as the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility also play an
important supporting role for investors who care about the inclusiveness of
corporate boards.73
These voices have not been without impact. The Investor Responsibility
Research Center, which provides impartial research on corporations and
shareholders, has reported that during the period from 1999 to 2002, board
diversity resolutions achieved the highest average vote of any social issue
shareholder proposals and in 2003 that support exceeded 25 percent.74 The
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widespread adoption of the requirement that directors receive a majority
vote (i.e., more affirmative votes than votes withheld) rather than simply a
plurality of the votes cast would add considerable strength to the exercise of
proxies along the lines described above.
ENTERING A PERIOD OF TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE
Although the foregoing factors have not yet resulted in any dramatic in-
creases in the number of women directors and senior executives in Ameri-
can corporations, they provide a very strong foundation upon which to
construct new strategies and forge new alliances that may themselves bring
about significant change. Sometimes it is necessary to convey the same
message in several different ways before it is truly “heard.” And sometimes
an indirect approach, or advocacy from an unexpected source, can be more
persuasive than repeated calls for action by those who have been beating
the drum for years. In that context, the following trends suggest that the
proverbial “tipping point” may well be within reach.
A New Wave of Shareholder Activism and Governance Reform
A certain amount of corporate board turnover resulted from the statutory
and regulatory changes and increased attention paid to corporate gover-
nance during the first several years of this century. More recently, some
important new voices have joined those who have traditionally advocated
for change. Governance rating organizations are increasingly taking public
positions on proxy issues involving corporate governance, mainstream
institutional investors are now being required to do the same, and wide-
spread publicity about issues such as excessive management compensation
and the backdating of stock options is providing new support for share-
holder resolutions designed to increase accountability on the part of both
management and boards of directors. These trends are creating a climate in
which the business case for diversifying corporate leadership becomes even
more compelling than in the past. Simply put, there is a tremendous need for
talented and independent-minded candidates for corporate boards and
executive positions, individuals who understand and can implement the very
best practices of corporate governance and at the same time bring new
perspectives to bear on the critical issues facing American companies today.
The increased visibility of governance rating firms. Following the corpo-
rate scandals that resulted in Sarbanes-Oxley and closer scrutiny of corpo-
rate governance, firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS),
which previously had provided only research and related services, devel-
oped sets of governance rating metrics that they use to measure the perfor-
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mance of their clients and companies of interest to their subscribers. Some
of them also offer services designed to assist their clients to improve their
governance practices.75 While each of these firms has its own set of evalua-
tion criteria, their rating systems all include standards relating to board
structure, composition and processes, stock ownership issues, board and
executive compensation, shareholder rights, accounting controls, disclosure,
and oversight.
Governance rating firms provide these ratings to their subscribers,
typically the companies they rate and institutional investors. When re-
quested by their institutional investor clients, at least one of these firms, ISS,
also makes recommendations about how to vote their proxies. These recom-
mendations are now available to the public, either directly from ISS itself or
indirectly from its clients and others who refer to the recommendations
when explaining the positions they take on important issues.76 This visibility
adds significantly to the influence of the rating firms.
Most rating firms have excluded leadership diversity from the factors
against which they measure individual companies, either because they view
diversity as a social rather than a governance issue or because it is too
difficult to track. However, ISS has expressed its willingness to support
some shareholder proposals that seek to increase the representation of
women on corporate boards.77 Moreover, ISS has taken strong positions in
favor of majority voting for directors, an independent board chair, closer
scrutiny of the independence of non-executive directors, and limits on the
number of outside boards on which a director serves. Its proxy voting
guidelines also address some of the major issues confronting Audit and
Compensation Committees. Even in uncontested elections, ISS will recom-
mend withholding votes from individual director nominees, members of
Audit and Compensation Committees, or the entire slate of directors in a
variety of circumstances that do not comport with the firm’s corporate
governance policies.78
In view of the reputation of ISS as a respected source of research and
thinking about matters of corporate governance, public access to its guide-
lines and specific proxy recommendations will heighten the need for corpo-
rate board nominating committees to pay more careful attention to the
composition of their boards. To the extent that current directors incorporate
into the board evaluation process the policies underlying the ISS guidelines
and recommendations, the number of board vacancies likely will increase.79
And to the extent that nominating committees take these policies into
account when recruiting new directors, the as yet untapped pool of qualified
and independent-minded women should be major beneficiaries.
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Mandatory public disclosure of mutual fund proxy votes. Until August
2004, few if any mutual funds disclosed how they were voting the proxies
that they hold on behalf of their investors. At the prodding of socially
responsible investors who questioned the tendency of mutual funds to vote
automatically with management and who raised the possibility that at least
some mutual fund votes may reflect conflicts of interest when the fund
managers seek contracts for company 401(k) or other services, the SEC
promulgated new rules that require mutual funds to disclose their actual
proxy votes, their guidelines and procedures for voting on proxy items, and
the manner in which they address conflicts of interest in the proxy-voting
process.80 Those rules required the public disclosure on or before August 31,
2004, of all proxy votes by mutual funds during the period from July 1,
2003, through June 30, 2004.
Although it is still not a simple matter for the average person to effi-
ciently collect all relevant information about the manner in which mutual
funds are complying with this mandate,81 the Social Investment Forum has
published a study analyzing certain proxy votes by several individual funds
within each of the ten largest U.S. mutual fund families during the first year
of mandatory disclosure. The Forum examined the voting patterns of these
mutual funds on a range of corporate governance and social issues, as well
as on “vote-no campaigns” targeting the directors of four companies.
Among other things, the Forum reports that the funds within all but one of
the ten conventional mutual fund families voted against management on
proposals to declassify the election of directors.82 While many of the mutual
funds abstained from voting on the six social and environmental issues
reviewed by the Forum, some funds voted against management on each of
those issues, and nearly one-third voted for resolutions to prohibit discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation.83 Finally, on the votes for directors at
the four companies that received the highest percentage of withheld votes
during the year ended June 30, 2004, more of the mutual funds withheld
votes than supported the directors, although the Forum reports a high level
of inconsistency in the voting.84
The Forum notes, however, that the four mutual fund families that most
often supported management (Fidelity, Vanguard, American, and Federated)
include the three largest in the United States and that a number of funds
voted with management even on non-controversial (“plain vanilla”) corpo-
rate governance resolutions and “vote-no campaigns” that had widespread
investor support.85 Because these votes are now public, there will be in-
creased scrutiny of the manner in which mutual fund managers exercise
their fiduciary duty to shareholders. In light of the importance of mutual
funds, this is an area of strategic importance to all those who advocate
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better corporate governance and more opportunities for women in corpo-
rate leadership.86
Mutual funds today hold more than 9.3 trillion in assets, of which more
than $5.8 trillion is in stock funds and hybrid funds.87 The Investment
Company Institute reports that as of June 2005, $91.3 million individual
investors owned mutual funds88 and that as of the end of 2003, individuals,
as opposed to institutional investors, held 77 percent of all mutual fund
assets.89 Thus, not only do mutual funds have tremendous power to effect
change in corporate governance through the proxies they vote, but there is
now a way for their investors to encourage them to do so. Mutual fund
investors can, individually and collectively, attempt to persuade fund man-
agers to exercise their proxies in a more progressive manner.90 They can
also start to factor into their investment decisions the voting records of
competing funds. In a period when many question the leadership of mutual
fund managers as much as they question corporate leadership, the publica-
tion of information relating to voting policies and procedures and potential
conflicts of interest should take on increasing importance.
Thus, public disclosure of mutual fund proxy voting provides a new
opportunity for mutual fund investors to make their voices heard on issues
of importance to them. And it also provides an opportunity for individual or
families of mutual funds to distinguish themselves from their competitors.91
To the extent that mutual fund managers align themselves with the propo-
nents of improved corporate governance, they will, at least indirectly, help
to create a climate that welcomes new faces and fresh perspectives to
boardrooms and executive suites.92
Recent successes of shareholder activists. The recent success of the
majority vote movement is attributable to the influence of shareholder
activists, primarily the building trades unions. During the 2006 proxy
season through March 2006, shareholders filed 140 proposals calling for the
election of directors by a majority rather than a plurality of votes cast,
compared to 89 such proposals in all of 2005 and twelve in 2004.93 Share-
holder support for these proposals has been growing over this period,
leading some companies to negotiate agreements to adopt policies or bylaw
amendments incorporating majority voting or director resignation provi-
sions without the need for a shareholder vote on the issue. ISS reports that
the average vote in support of majority vote proposals during the first half
of 2006 was 47.7 percent, and it exceeded 50 percent at 35 companies,
nearly three times the number in 2005.94 Furthermore, most of the compa-
nies in which shareholder support for majority voting proposals was low
had already instituted policies that require a director who is elected with
less than majority support to tender his or her resignation and the company
to justify its decision to accept or reject the resignation.95
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The fact that approximately 180 companies have adopted a majority vote
or director resignation policy does not satisfy shareholder activists. Many of
the union pension funds intend to continue the pressure in 2007 and to file
majority vote proposals even at companies that have director resignation
policies, arguing that those policies are not enough to make directors ac-
countable to shareholder concerns.96 In addition, the unions will file binding
proposals at companies “with poorly performing boards, where in our
opinion at least some of the directors need to be replaced.”97 ISS expects
that “investors could be looking at a tidal wave of majority vote resolutions
in 2007.”98
The other major corporate governance issue on which shareholders have
been particularly successful is that of declassifying boards so that all direc-
tors must be elected annually. As of August 9, 2006, forty such resolutions
received an average vote of 67.6 percent according to ISS.99 Coupled with
the number of companies that have been voluntarily eliminating classified
boards, ISS expects that the majority of S&P 500 directors will be subject to
annual election by the end of 2006.100
Women’s advocacy groups, as well as all others who are seeking ways to
hold corporate leaders more accountable, have reason to be pleased by the
accomplishments of these shareholder activists. Annual elections and major-
ity voting together offer significantly more opportunity to monitor the
performance of both directors and management and to bring about change
when and where necessary. All directors, not just members of nominating
committees, are likely to pay attention.101 And, here, too, women candidates
for leadership positions are highly likely to benefit.
The Advent of the Critical Mass
Although women have not yet become directors and executive officers in
the numbers or at the speed that many would wish, the point may be near
when enough women have assumed positions of corporate leadership that
the pace of further progress can be significantly increased. Once companies
move beyond tokenism — when a second or third woman is added to the
boardroom or executive suite — women are more likely to be assessed and
accepted based on their individual merits. As the burdens of stereotyping
fall away, women will be judged on the unique set of attributes that each of
them brings to her leadership position, rather than primarily in terms of
their gender.102 In addition, there is evidence that a critical mass of three
women directors can bring important changes to boardroom dynamics and
improve corporate governance.103
There also is evidence that as additional women are brought into the
boardroom and executive suite, the opportunities for them to attain posi-
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tions of power are increased. For example, Catalyst has found that as the
number of women directors grows, so does the likelihood that a woman will
chair the audit, compensation or nominating/governance committee.104
Furthermore, the presence of even one woman on a nominating committee
can be extremely helpful in assuring that the pool of future board candidates
will include other women and that they are not held to a higher standard
than men.105 Women directors can also have similar impact on the makeup
of a company’s senior management.
In 2005, 265 of the Fortune 500 companies had two or more women
directors, and women comprised 25 percent or more of the directors of 64 of
those companies.106 Of the top 200 S&P 500 companies, 128 had more than
one woman director.107 Similarly, more than half of the fifty largest public
companies in the Chicago area had multiple women directors. The compa-
nies included in the studies of the other members of ION that reported
comparable data for 2005 were much smaller and, not surprisingly, those
with two or more women directors were relatively fewer, ranging from
about 12 percent to 28 percent of the total number of public companies
researched.108 Each of the seven organizations whose findings were included
in the February 2006 ION Report found that at least five companies in their
respective regions had boards on which women were 25 percent or more of
the total number of directors.109
While not overwhelming, these statistics provide grounds for optimism. A
sufficient number of women are now in positions where they can make a
difference. They are extremely valuable allies for those seeking to speed up
the pace of change. Advocates would, therefore, do well to enlist their
support.110
Expansion of the Talent Pipeline
Over the past decade or so, a strong pool of women board candidates has
been established. Comprised of top executives from Fortune 1000 compa-
nies, college and university presidents, former public officials, and the heads
of large foundations and nonprofit organizations, these women by now are
(or should be) well known to corporate board nominating committees,
CEOs, and executive recruiters. For this reason, and because they are very
accomplished, they often sit on multiple boards and are repeatedly invited to
join others.
It is time now to pay more attention to expanding the pipeline to include
the next generation of corporate leaders. The demand for new independent
directors is increasing at hundreds if not thousands of public companies
throughout the United States, not to mention mutual funds and privately
held and venture-backed companies. Many of the women who comprised
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the “first wave” of women directors are reaching mandatory retirement age
or are leaving board service for other reasons. It is, therefore, necessary to
develop additional sources of board candidates. Women who come from
nontraditional backgrounds, who are current or recently retired CEOs,
COOs and CFOs of companies beyond the Fortune 1000, who are Chief
Information Officers or otherwise have expertise in the areas of technology
and science, who are financial experts, who have the background that will
enable them to add great value to compensation committees, who have deep
international experience, or who are retired partners of major accounting or
consulting firms — all of these women are among those who should be
considered as potential corporate directors.
Just as nominating committees and executive recruiters need to look
beyond the groups of individuals they have traditionally targeted for direc-
tor positions, they also must be prepared to consider women who have no
prior experience serving on a corporate (as opposed to a nonprofit or
professional association) board. This adjustment of focus is just beginning to
happen.111
For their part, women who want to ready themselves for board positions
are starting to design more effective strategies and to devote the time and
effort that is necessary to succeed in this quest. They are educating them-
selves about corporate governance and best practices, assessing their
individual qualifications and the strengths they can bring to a board. They
are finding more opportunities to develop the necessary skills and to other-
wise enhance their qualifications for board service. They are taking steps to
become more visible and to showcase their talents to the people who can
help them achieve their objectives. They are learning the value of effective
networking and to build and leverage their connections. They are starting to
seek help actively from those in a position to open the doors for them. In
this way, more women are becoming “known” to current directors, execu-
tive recruiters, and the lawyers, accountants, and consultants who often are
asked to recommend candidates for board positions.
At the same time, additional resources designed to assist both board
candidates and nominating committees are becoming more widespread and
are playing an important role in making sure that the pipeline of talent
keeps growing and can be accessed by those who need it. Thus, there are a
variety of programs for individuals who want to serve on corporate boards,
covering everything from education about the responsibilities of a director
and the risks and rewards of board service to detailed instruction and
coaching on how to go about obtaining a board seat.112 Many of the educa-
tional and networking programs offered by the National Association of
Corporate Directors, executive recruiters, academic institutions, major
accounting firms, and others are open to prospective directors. There are
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also training programs designed specifically for women, such as those
conducted by some of the regional members of ION.
Finally, women’s advocacy groups, such as ION, are assuming an increas-
ingly important role in bringing highly qualified women to the attention of
nominating committees. They do so both by working directly with commit-
tee members and by helping search firms and others who are seeking candi-
dates for particular company boards.113 Because these groups have closer
connections to the women in their respective communities, they can identify
women candidates who are not yet on the radar screens of nominating
committees and executive recruiters and who might otherwise be over-
looked. In addition, these organizations engage in extensive outreach to
those in positions of influence, including current women directors, in order
to dispel the myths that have created artificial barriers to the advancement
of women to positions of corporate leadership. In short, it no longer should
take any great effort for companies and their agents to identify talented
women directors. The pipeline has been expanding and it is becoming
qualitatively stronger every day.
Lessons from Abroad
Considerable publicity has attended the government of Norway’s imposition
of a requirement that between one-third and one-half of the directors of
every publicly registered company be women by the end of 2007. As of
January 2006, no new company will be listed unless its board conforms to
this requirement. Any currently listed company that does not comply by the
end of 2007 will be dissolved, the sanction for all companies that do not
satisfy statutory requirements. A major force behind the legislation was the
Conservative Minister of Economics who took a strong public position that
board diversity was good for both the companies and for the Norwegian
economy. The 40 percent goal is based on the fact that since 1981, women
have held about 40 percent of  government posts.114
The March 2002 Norwegian statute had required all publicly owned (by
State or municipality) enterprises to have 40 percent women directors by
January 2004, but gave publicly registered companies until the end of 2005
to increase voluntarily the percentage of women on their boards. At the
time of enactment, only 7 percent of all directors of the nearly 500 listed
companies were women; within a few years, by May 2005, the figure had
jumped to 15.7 percent.115 From June 30, 2005, to January 1, 2006, the
percentage increased by another two points.116 Thus, after having trailed
the United States for decades, Norway has quite quickly become the world-
wide leader in recruiting women to corporate boards.
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While only a few other countries are taking a similar approach to the
issue of corporate board diversification,117 the Norwegian example provides
some very useful lessons for the United States. Most important, once the
need to appoint women to corporate boards is recognized, qualified women
directors can be found and recruited for service. Just as women have filled
about 40 percent of the leadership positions in Norwegian government since
the early 1980s, they are now joining the boards of Norwegian companies
at a very rapid pace. In addition, although undoubtedly there was some
resistance to and grumbling about the imposition of quotas, the process of
diversification appears to be going forward without any setbacks. Indeed,
as the larger Norwegian companies have already demonstrated, the policy
rationale behind the legislation is basically sound.
In Sweden, where governmental officials have several times threatened to
introduce legislation to impose a quota similar to that of Norway,118 all
public and private companies with more than ten employees have been
required since January 2004 to disclose in their annual reports the numbers
of men and women on their boards of directors.119 While it is unclear
whether or to what extent the mandatory disclosure of this information has
had an impact on board composition, the pace at which women have been
joining Swedish boards has increased over the past few years. At the very
least, the inclusion of this information in a highlighted section of an annual
report serves to focus the reader’s attention on the subject.120 And publicity
around the issue of board diversity has always been a useful tool for ad-
vancing women to positions of corporate leadership.121
Finally, in the United Kingdom, governmental leadership on the issue of
corporate board diversity has taken a different form and does not involve
legislation of any kind. The British Government serves as a leading voice for
equality in business and for greater diversity in the boardroom. In Decem-
ber 2004, simultaneously with the publication of the 2004 Female FTSE
Report, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, who also served at
the time as the Cabinet Minister for Women, released a guide entitled
“Building Better Boards.” In addition to encouraging both companies and
search firms to carefully review their criteria for board positions and make
sure that the nomination process does not disadvantage candidates from
nontraditional backgrounds, the Minister announced that henceforth all
government recruiters would be required to present more diverse fields of
candidates for the myriad of positions that are filled every year.122 The
Government also has joined with senior women from business and academia
to establish a “cross-company mentoring” program that matches the chair-
man/CEO of one of the FTSE 100 companies with a senior woman executive
from another, non-competing FTSE 100 company. Each chairman/CEO who
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participates in the program nominates a woman from his own company to
be mentored by another chairman.123 In less than two full years, at least 30
chairmen joined this program and several mentees have assumed top roles
in their own or other companies.124
While it is too early to assess the impact of these various initiatives, all of
them reflect a commitment to change on the part of those with the power to
make it happen. The examples of other countries may suggest some new
strategies and potential allies that can help to tip the balance towards parity
in corporate leadership here.125
CONCLUSION
The building blocks described earlier in this article, especially the business
case for welcoming women into corporate boardrooms and executive suites,
provide a strong foundation for changing the face of corporate leadership in
the United States. The force of the recent trends identified immediately
above: the increasing number of ways in which pressure is being placed on
the board nominating process by institutional investors, shareholder activ-
ists, and other proponents of improved corporate governance; the emer-
gence of a new generation of talented women, ready and ambitious to
assume top executive and board positions; the impact of the cohort of
women who already hold such positions; and the examples of other coun-
tries that have recently taken steps to boost significantly the number of
women who serve on their corporate boards — all this promises to provide
the energy necessary to accelerate the pace of change. What remains to be
seen is whether the proponents of leadership diversity are able to build
strategic coalitions that can catalyze these forces and make sure that the
transformation process will be measured in years rather than decades.
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